

# **Bailiwick of Guernsey Law Enforcement**

An inspection of the capability and  
capacity of Guernsey Police and  
Guernsey Border Agency  
Revisit

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# Summary

In 2017, the Bailiwick of Guernsey's Committee for Home Affairs invited Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to inspect policing and border control arrangements. These are provided by two separate but closely connected organisations: Guernsey Police and Guernsey Border Agency. They are collectively known as Bailiwick Law Enforcement (BLE).

We conducted an inspection of BLE in late 2017 and early 2018; and published a [report highlighting our findings](#) in November 2018. It made 8 recommendations and highlighted a further 26 areas for improvement.

In 2019, the Committee for Home Affairs invited us to evaluate BLE's progress in addressing the recommendations and areas for improvement.

We have summarised our 2019 findings on the 2017–18 recommendations and areas for improvement in the list below.

## Progress against our 2018 recommendations

In our 2018 report, we proposed that the eight recommendations should be addressed by 31 January 2019.

### Recommendation 1

The Committee for Home Affairs, in consultation with the head of law enforcement and other stakeholders, should carry out a post-implementation review and future options appraisal of BLE. The outcome should provide evidence upon which to base a strategic vision for BLE's future.

The Committee for Home Affairs has addressed this recommendation.

Although it decided not to carry out a post-implementation review, it has made a clear decision about the future structure of BLE. While Guernsey Police and Guernsey Border Agency form part of BLE, they won't fully merge. That decision should enable it to create a strategic vision for the organisation.

### Recommendation 2

The head of law enforcement and Her Majesty's Procureur should conduct a review of working practices to find out why there are delays associated with letters of request for mutual legal assistance.

The Law Officers of the Crown and BLE have addressed this recommendation.

Their review confirmed there were long delays in responses to letters of request. This was due to problems with administrative procedures that have now been resolved.

They went on to create a memorandum of understanding that sets appropriate time limits for each stage in the request process. It was signed by Her Majesty's Procureur and the head of BLE in September 2019.

### **Recommendation 3**

The head of law enforcement should design and implement an action plan to improve the quality of BLE's victim care, including:

- more widespread use of care plans and victim personal statements; and
- renewed efforts to relocate the video interview suite.

The head of law enforcement has made progress in addressing this recommendation by relocating and improving the video interview suite. However, other aspects of our recommendation remain outstanding.

Officers don't consistently update victims or ask them if they want to make a victim personal statement. BLE should produce a victim care policy to help make sure that officers give a consistently good level of victim care.

### **Recommendation 4**

The head of BLE should work with appropriate agencies to evaluate reported domestic violence incidents to establish whether Domestic Violence Prevention Orders or Notices (DVPOs and DVPNs) would have provided valuable additional protection to victims, had they been available.

If the evaluation shows that they would, the Committee for Home Affairs should consider pursuing changes to legislation to introduce them to the Bailiwick of Guernsey.

The head of law enforcement and the Committee for Home Affairs have addressed this recommendation.

The States of Guernsey's domestic abuse strategy team worked with BLE and other interested parties to evaluate whether DVPOs and DVPNs would support victims of domestic violence and concluded that they would be beneficial.

The Committee for Home Affairs accepted their findings and is consulting the local governments of Alderney and Sark. The Committee plans to submit a policy letter to the [States of Deliberation](#) (the States of Deliberation are the legislature and government of Guernsey), [recommending a change in legislation](#), when it has completed the consultation later in 2020.

### **Recommendation 5**

The Committee for Home Affairs should publish a strategic plan that sets out BLE's business objectives and priorities. BLE should use this to inform a revised service delivery plan.

This recommendation remains outstanding.

The Committee for Home Affairs hasn't created a strategic plan for BLE. It recognises that setting a strategic direction and priorities for BLE gives it a foundation on which it can develop BLE's estates, people and ICT strategies. However, developing a set of strategic objectives and priorities that reflect the risks Guernsey faces, as well as the concerns of its population, isn't a simple task and it lacks evidence about the risks Guernsey faces and the concerns of its population.<sup>1</sup> However, it has developed and signed a new protocol document with the head of law enforcement. This clarifies the Committee's responsibilities, which include setting a strategic direction and objectives for BLE.

### **Recommendation 6**

The Committee for Home Affairs should work with the head of law enforcement to create a document that clarifies each party's responsibilities for:

- objective and priority setting;
- strategic governance and oversight;
- operational direction and control;
- independence; and
- provision of performance information for governance purposes.

The Committee for Home Affairs and head of law enforcement have addressed this recommendation by developing, signing and complying with the new *Protocol concerning the relationship between the Committee for Home Affairs and the Head of Law Enforcement and implementing Recommendation 6 of the HMICFRS report 2018*. This clarifies each party's responsibilities in the way we recommended.

The Committee should consider making this part of Bailiwick law to ensure that its findings and insights aren't lost in future.

### **Recommendation 7**

The head of law enforcement should ensure that information on Guernsey Border Agency's complaints procedure is made available to the public and is easily accessible.

The head of law enforcement has addressed this recommendation.

Guernsey Border Agency has added a link to its complaints procedures on its page on the States' website and prominently displays information about complaints procedures in the public areas of its premises.

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<sup>1</sup> We note that the Committee published an updated Home Affairs Delivery Plan in 2020, following the inspection, which seeks, in part, to address the gaps in strategic direction and objectives.

## **Recommendation 8**

The head of law enforcement should ensure that retrospective vetting is carried out on all staff recruited before the current policy was introduced in 2012.

The head of law enforcement has addressed this recommendation.

BLE reviewed the vetting status of its workforce to identify officers and support staff who hadn't been subject to the vetting process. During the first half of 2019, these people were retrospectively vetted. Everyone passed the process.

## **Progress against our 2017–18 areas for improvement**

### **Area for improvement 1: BLE's understanding of demand**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE didn't have a process for regularly collecting data from a range of sources. Such data would enable it to compile a comprehensive, annual strategic threat and risk assessment. This would give BLE a more holistic view of demand that would also help with strategic planning.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- BLE's understanding of demand remains an area for improvement;
- BLE hasn't produced the strategic threat and risk assessment suggested in this area for improvement, although it has conducted a range of activities to understand demand; and
- ICT problems, including not being able to access or extract data from ICT systems, have hampered BLE's ability to produce a strategic threat and risk assessment.

### **Area for improvement 2: BLE's arrangements for formal public consultation and communication**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE could do more to consult with the public and involve them in setting local and strategic priorities. Such activity would give BLE an opportunity to feed back on its actions and performance.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- community engagement remains an area for improvement in some parts of the Bailiwick of Guernsey;
- BLE has strengthened its arrangements for formal public consultation and communication on strategic and local priorities; and
- neighbourhood policing would benefit from additional resources— BLE should seek to expand neighbourhood policing to all Guernsey parishes. This is a new area for improvement.

### **Area for improvement 3: BLE's lack of a process for assessing the effect of abstractions**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE didn't assess the impact of abstracting (taking away) police officers from their primary roles – in particular, from neighbourhood teams and roads policing.

Our 2019 inspection found that BLE:

- monitors the scale of abstractions by reviewing resource data and making abstractions a standing agenda item at workforce planning meetings; and
- has sought to reduce abstractions through a range of initiatives including revising its recruitment strategy.

However, BLE's lack of a process for assessing the effect of abstractions remains an area for improvement.

#### **Area for improvement 4: The timely availability of occupational health services**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that it was sometimes difficult for BLE staff to obtain assistance from occupational health services when they needed it. This was because the service was provided through a centralised States of Guernsey arrangement, which wasn't based in the Bailiwick.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- the timely availability of occupational health services remains an area for improvement;
- BLE had met with the States' human resources team and other government departments to try to resolve the issue; and
- BLE is unable to change its occupational health arrangements as it is bound by the States' occupational health contracts.

#### **Area for improvement 5: Compliance with the crime recording rules and crime data integrity**

Our 2017–18 inspection identified problems with the organisation's crime recording practices. In several instances, offences and detections hadn't been recorded. However, BLE had started to address these problems with a new policy and performance regime.

Our 2019 inspection found that BLE has:

- improved compliance with crime recording rules (and therefore crime data integrity has improved);
- trained officers on its new crime recording policy; and
- created audit and review mechanisms to monitor and increase compliance.

#### **Area for improvement 6: External communications activity**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE could do more to reassure the public that crime in the Bailiwick of Guernsey is low. We suggested it could do this through increased public engagement and more effective use of communications channels. We also suggested that the Committee for Home Affairs play a role in this activity.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- BLE has improved communications activities by making more effective use of external and social media to make sure the public have accurate information about crime levels; and

- a new approach to communications, focusing more on social media rather than traditional media, is giving BLE greater control of its communications.

The 2020 crime survey will give valuable insight as to whether it has been successful.

### **Area for improvement 7: Scrutiny of problem-solving policing plans is an area for improvement**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE didn't conduct formal results analysis of the effectiveness of its problem-solving plans.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- BLE has improved scrutiny of the effectiveness of its problem solving plans; and
- neighbourhood teams take responsibility for most problem-solving plans, and sergeants regularly review their actions.

### **Area for improvement 8: The range of crime prevention advice on the Guernsey Police website**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that crime prevention advice on the Guernsey Police website only covered "getting safe online". There was scope for it to expand and improve the content.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- BLE has increased the range of crime prevention advice on the Guernsey Police website; and
- Guernsey Police has redesigned its website to include a page on crime prevention and reduction advice.

### **Area for improvement 9: BLE's strategic approach to tackling anti-social behaviour**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE wasn't regularly reviewing how effectively it responded to anti-social behaviour, even though it was included in the 2013–16 business plan and [Service Delivery Plan 2017–2020](#). BLE also lacked data that would enable it to understand trends and assess its activity. This area for improvement suggested that BLE put measures in place to improve incident recording and performance management.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- this area for improvement has been addressed;
- BLE has put measures in place to improve the recording of anti-social behaviour incidents; and
- officers now record anti-social behaviour incidents on NICHE (BLE's computerised records management system), which enables BLE to analyse its performance, as well as to direct operations at specific targets.



## **Area for improvement 10: The Joint Emergency Services Control Centre's (JESCC) emergency dispatch software and performance management framework**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that:

- JESCC's call-handling system, ProQA, generated a pre-set list of questions that weren't suitable for callers in the Bailiwick of Guernsey (as they had been designed for law enforcement in the USA); and
- there was no performance management framework and important management information, such as the average time taken to answer emergency calls, wasn't routinely monitored.

This area for improvement suggested that BLE ensure these areas were addressed in any future equipment upgrades or capital investment plans.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- JESCC's emergency dispatch software and performance management framework remain areas for improvement;
- BLE can't resolve the problems with ProQA, including amending the question sets, until its ICT recovery programme has been completed; and
- the JESCC steering group<sup>2</sup> should regularly review a wider range of performance information.

## **Area for improvement 11: The consistency of supervision for criminal investigations**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that investigations were often well supervised in specialist departments, but that the quality of supervision wasn't as consistent elsewhere. BLE's criminal justice unit had taken on a quality assurance role and prosecutors were providing training. The area for improvement suggested that:

- BLE should set clear expectations for supervisors about the frequency and depth of supervision required, training them if necessary; and
- inspectors should carry out regular dip checks to provide assurance that these expectations were met.

We concluded that effective supervision is especially important in low-crime environments such as the Bailiwick of Guernsey, where investigators have fewer opportunities to build the skills and experience they need to succeed.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- the consistency of supervision for criminal investigations remains an area for improvement, especially in response teams;
- BLE still lacks robust processes to monitor and assure the quality of investigations;
- inspectors aren't regularly dip sampling investigations; and

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<sup>2</sup> Membership of the group includes the head of law enforcement, fire and rescue chief officer, harbour master, chief ambulance officer, deputy chief ambulance officer, chief inspector – operational support, and the JESCC manager.

- by **1 May 2021**, the BLE's senior leadership team should make sure that all response officers have received Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP) 1 investigation training. This is a new recommendation.

### **Area for improvement 12: The quality of continuous professional development for investigators in specialist units**

Our 2017–18 inspection found inconsistencies in the continuous professional development offered to BLE's detectives. This had resulted in some officers having to investigate serious crimes without adequate knowledge of how to do so. Although we acknowledged that there weren't enough resources to provide consistent continuous professional development, this area for improvement suggested that the Committee for Home Affairs and BLE ensure that all investigators in specialist units have sufficient access to development opportunities.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- work to address this area for improvement is ongoing;
- investigators in specialist units don't have access to PIP accreditation and continuous professional development, unlike their counterparts in England and Wales;
- BLE is exploring whether officers investigate enough serious crime to develop the mandatory portfolio of investigation that forms part of the PIP accreditation process; and
- the Committee for Home Affairs secured an increase to BLE's training budget in 2019, which should enable more continuous professional development.

### **Area for improvement 13: Guernsey Border Agency's capability to carry out automatic checks of passenger and freight manifests against relevant law enforcement intelligence databases**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE lacked access to systems and intelligence that would help detection officers target customs searches (otherwise known as border checks). At that time, BLE was exploring whether UK authorities could help it to automate border checks. This area for improvement suggested that BLE include this capability, along with access to the Police National Database, in its ICT proposals.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- automatic checks remain an area for improvement and this features in BLE's ICT investment and development proposals;
- BLE is still unable to access the Police National Database; and
- in June 2019, BLE made an application (not yet approved) to the States' ICT minor capital board, for funding to purchase a system that would automate checks of passenger and freight manifests.

#### **Area for improvement 14: BLE's understanding of its performance concerning smuggling and the unlawful supply of controlled drugs**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE lacked a framework that would help it understand its performance on tackling drug trafficking in the Bailiwick of Guernsey. This area for improvement suggested it develop a framework that draws on all available data from law enforcement and other sources.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- work to address this area for improvement continues;
- BLE has been working with the health and social services department and other government departments to develop a more comprehensive assessment of the availability and misuse of controlled drugs in the Bailiwick of Guernsey;
- representatives from BLE, the health and social services department and partner agencies exchange data relating to substance misuse in a range of workgroups; and
- BLE is part of a joint substance misuse steering group that is developing data sets to assess the scale of the use of controlled drugs and looking to formalise information sharing (which is otherwise ad hoc).

#### **Area for improvement 15: The THEMIS system is an area for improvement**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that THEMIS, the computer system that financial institutions use to submit suspicious activity reports (SARs), required system upgrades to make it stable and reliable, and to enable its use for intelligence development and analysis purposes.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- THEMIS upgrades hadn't been completed and this remains an area for improvement; and
- THEMIS users are still experiencing the problems we highlighted in 2018.

However, considerable progress has been made to resolve these problems, including the recent installation of computer upgrades. This should make THEMIS more reliable and enable staff to export data for analysis.

#### **Area for improvement 16: BLE's approach to identifying vulnerable people**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE didn't have a definition of vulnerability. This area for improvement suggested that BLE create one and ensure it was applied. This would help officers and staff identify vulnerable people.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- BLE's approach to identifying vulnerable people remains an area for improvement; and
- although it has developed a definition of vulnerability, this isn't yet widely known or understood among the workforce.

BLE should make sure that officers are aware of the definition, and supervisors should check they are using it to identify vulnerable people.

### **Area for improvement 17: BLE's process for assessing vulnerability in cases not involving domestic violence**

Our 2017–18 inspection didn't find any evidence that BLE officers routinely assess the vulnerability of the victims, witnesses and suspects they encounter in non-domestic violence cases. This area for improvement suggested that BLE develop processes to ensure officers could identify vulnerabilities and make appropriate interventions.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- this area for improvement has been addressed; and
- while BLE has developed a process to make sure officers identify any vulnerable victims, witnesses and suspects they encounter in non-domestic violence cases, this won't be fully effective until the workforce has a clear understanding of the force's definition of vulnerability.

### **Area for improvement 18: BLE's case allocation practices for public protection cases**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE's public protection unit (PPU) didn't carry out all investigations relating to domestic abuse, sexual offences or cases involving child protection. It lacked a clear risk-based case allocation policy. We suggested it develop such a policy in this area for improvement.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- BLE has produced a risk-based crime allocation matrix and has integrated it into its [THRIVE](#) policy;
- most of the investigations we examined had been allocated to the appropriate units, but because the allocation matrix isn't used in all cases, allocation practices for public protection cases will remain an area for improvement until it is always applied; and
- BLE has a plan to review compliance with the allocation matrix, as part of a post-implementation review of THRIVE in early 2020.

### **Area for improvement 19: The level of training provided to specialist investigators**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE didn't give some officers in specialist units enough training. PPU officers were concerned that their training didn't equip them with the specialist knowledge they needed to deal with vulnerable people, or to advise uniformed colleagues. This area for improvement suggested that BLE develop a better understanding of specialist investigators' training needs and ensure it met them.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- BLE has made progress in providing training for specialist investigators;
- PPU officers have received additional training and all now feel confident they have the skills they need to fulfil their role; and

- work to resolve gaps in economic crime division officers' training is ongoing – the States' policy and resources committee has approved a business case for additional resources and training within an overall allocation of £1.3m.

### **Area for improvement 20: BLE's capacity to discharge its responsibilities in the multi-agency public protection arrangements is an area for improvement**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that a lack of capacity in BLE's MAPPA (multi-agency public protection arrangements) unit was delaying home visits to violent offenders and registered sex offenders. This area for improvement suggested that BLE increase capacity to reduce individual officers' workloads and enable more frequent home visits.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- work is underway to address this area for improvement; and
- BLE has increased the capacity in its MAPPA unit.

### **Area for improvement 21: The process for agreeing BLE's annual budget**

Our 2017–18 inspection identified problems with the way that BLE's annual budget was agreed. This area for improvement suggested that the budget be set sufficiently far in advance (with in-year adjustments as required), to enable effective business planning.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- this area for improvement has been addressed; and
- the process for agreeing BLE's annual budget has improved – the head of BLE was informed of BLE's 2020 budget in October 2019.

### **Area for improvement 22: Police complaints**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that the legislation concerning police complaints only enabled the Police Complaints Commission to say it was satisfied or dissatisfied with an investigation. It didn't allow the Commission to provide any explanation of why it was dissatisfied, which risked causing confusion. This area for improvement suggested that the Committee for Home Affairs seek a minor amendment to the legislation and that, when doing so, it should review the recommendations of the 2014 comparative analysis and seek any further amendments it considered necessary. The area for improvement also suggested that the Committee for Home Affairs should consider extending the Police Complaints Commission's role to include complaints against the Guernsey Border Agency.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- BLE and the Committee for Home Affairs have conducted a review of the Bailiwick's police complaints legislation and have made revising the current legislation a priority; and
- changes to the police disciplinary system in England and Wales will inform the drafting of revised complaints legislation for Bailiwick of Guernsey police.

### **Area for improvement 23: BLE's ability to provide information to the College of Policing for inclusion in the disapproved register**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE was keen to share information with the College of Policing for inclusion in the disapproved register,<sup>3</sup> to support policing in England and Wales. However, there was no mechanism to share this information. This area for improvement suggested that the Committee for Home Affairs seek to enable BLE or the States to provide such information.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- this area for improvement has been addressed; and
- although BLE is still unable to access the 'advisory and barred list' (formerly known as the disapproved register) directly, it has an arrangement with an English force to add names to the list.

### **Area for improvement 24: BLE's counter-corruption capability**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that BLE lacked a robust counter-corruption capability. This area for improvement suggested that BLE compile a comprehensive local counter-corruption threat assessment and control strategy, to evaluate and manage the full range of risks to the integrity of the organisation.

Our 2019 inspection found that BLE has started to draft a counter-corruption threat assessment.

We suggested that BLE consider developing a collaborative counter-corruption capability with other forces across Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories. BLE plans to discuss this with forces from other Crown Dependencies in 2020.

### **Area for improvement 25: The management of human resources tasks**

Our 2017–18 inspection found that there was confusion about who was responsible for providing certain human resources services for BLE. This recommendation suggested that the central human resources team, in consultation with BLE, should provide a clearer definition of where responsibilities lie.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- this area for improvement has been addressed;
- the central human resources team has produced a flow chart outlining who is responsible for a range of human resources tasks; and
- the central human resources team is developing a comprehensive guide to human resources responsibilities, due in early 2020.

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<sup>3</sup> The College of Policing's disapproved register contains details of those officers who have been dismissed from the service or who either resigned or retired while subject to a gross misconduct investigation where it had been determined there would have been a case to answer.

## **Area for improvement 26: BLE's ICT provision**

Our 2017–18 inspection found a series of ICT problems affecting BLE. A Committee for Home Affairs ICT recovery plan was in place to address the most serious problems. It was evident that the systems needed major capital investment to upgrade them. BLE's ICT would remain a critical issue until the States' ICT received a greater level of attention and investment. This area for improvement suggested that the Committee for Home Affairs and the head of law enforcement prioritise the development of a new ICT improvement strategy.

Our 2019 inspection found that:

- significant progress has been made to improve BLE's ICT, although this isn't completed;
- the Committee for Home Affairs ICT recovery plan has progressed with most projects now completed; and
- planning for future ICT improvements has started.

# Introduction

## About us

HMICFRS is an independent inspectorate. We conduct statutory inspections of police forces and other law enforcement agencies in England and Wales. We also inspect law enforcement arrangements in British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies upon invitation from the relevant government.

## About Guernsey

The Bailiwick of Guernsey is a Crown Dependency comprising the islands of Guernsey, Alderney, Sark, Herm, Brecqhou, Jethou and Lihou, as well as several uninhabited islets. It covers an area of just over 63 square kilometres. The resident population is about 64,000. Guernsey's government is called the States of Guernsey, subsequently referred to as 'the States'.

## About Bailiwick Law Enforcement

The two organisations which comprise Bailiwick Law Enforcement are Guernsey Police and Guernsey Border Agency. Collectively, they are known as Bailiwick Law Enforcement (BLE).

BLE has operated under a single head and shared senior management team since 2013. BLE also includes other functions such as trading standards.

In many respects, BLE faces similar challenges to English and Welsh police forces and the UK Border Agency. But there are major differences. The Bailiwick of Guernsey has a small, tight-knit community which enjoys a high standard of living. They have low crime rates and very high public expectations of BLE. These are to keep crime low, manage the border well, give an attentive service and keep the community safe.

In 2017, the Bailiwick of Guernsey's Committee for Home Affairs invited HMICFRS to inspect policing and border control arrangements. We conducted an inspection of BLE, visiting the force in late 2017 and early 2018. We published a [report highlighting the findings of our inspection](#) in November 2018. It made eight recommendations and highlighted a further 26 areas for improvement.

In 2019, the Committee for Home Affairs invited us to inspect BLE's progress in addressing the recommendations and areas for improvement.



## **Methodology**

In 2019, in our fieldwork for this inspection, we:

- interviewed BLE personnel at all levels of the organisation, as well as members of the Committee for Home Affairs;
- consulted other interested parties in the States, local authorities and the third sector;
- analysed data and documents, including a comprehensive action plan that BLE had developed to address the recommendations and areas for improvement; and
- audited a sample of BLE's crime investigation files.

## **The layout and content of this report**

This report examines BLE's response to each of the recommendations and areas for improvement. It includes background information and our 2019 findings and judgments.

# Progress against recommendations

Of our eight recommendations, we consider five are fully dealt with. There has been progress on a further two and one remains outstanding.

## Recommendation 1

By 31 January 2019, the Committee for Home Affairs, in consultation with the head of law enforcement and other stakeholders, should carry out a post-implementation review and future options appraisal. The outcome of this work should provide enough evidence upon which to base a clear, compelling strategic vision for BLE's future.

### Background

BLE was created in 2013 with three objectives:

1. drive out inefficiencies;
2. encourage greater joint working; and
3. increase professionalism in a national agency environment.

These objectives had been achieved in part at the time of our 2017–18 inspection.

However, the Committee for Home Affairs hadn't conducted a formal post-implementation review or a future options appraisal. Our 2018 report said these were necessary to:

- analyse improvements realised by BLE's creation; and
- identify further benefits.

The Committee for Home Affairs was also responsible for evaluating wider options for change in emergency services, through the home operational services transformation programme. For example, combining or co-locating BLE with the fire and rescue service.

This transformation programme appeared to have made little progress for a long time. Consequently, the vision for BLE's future was unclear.

We asked the question: 'Would BLE become one integrated organisation or continue as two separate organisations managed by a single head of law enforcement, with some joint capabilities?'

## **Our findings in 2019**

The Committee for Home Affairs decided not to conduct a formal post-implementation review of BLE. Instead, it spoke with BLE management and staff, and called on its existing knowledge of the force. Through this, it assured itself that the current operating model – two separate organisations managed by a single head of law enforcement, with some joint capabilities – was appropriate.

In December 2019, the Committee for Home Affairs produced a document outlining its high-level vision for BLE. Its vision statement says the current operating model will endure and that it has no plan to merge Guernsey Police and Guernsey Border Agency.

## **Judgment**

The Committee for Home Affairs has addressed this recommendation.

Although it decided not to carry out a post-implementation review, it has made a clear decision about the future structure of BLE. That decision will enable it to create a strategic vision for the organisation.

## **Recommendation 2**

By 31 January 2019, the head of law enforcement and Her Majesty's Procureur should conduct a review of working practices to find out why there are delays associated with letters of request for mutual legal assistance.

## **Background**

[Our 2018 report](#) said that BLE's economic crime division routinely experienced unacceptably long delays getting responses from Guernsey Law Officers to letters of request (for mutual legal assistance) from overseas jurisdictions. Delays of months were commonplace and delays of a year or more weren't uncommon.

Letters of request can present complex issues that need careful handling. Nevertheless, the delays were worrying.

It was beyond the scope of our inspection to examine the underlying cause(s) of the delays. However, we believed the matter required urgent attention and rectification because of its adverse effect on the economic crime division's performance.

## **Our findings in 2019**

The Law Officers of the Crown and BLE conducted a joint review of all current letters of request for mutual legal assistance in 2019. The review confirmed that there were long delays in the Law Officers' responses to letters of request from overseas jurisdictions. This was due to problems with their administrative procedures, which have now been resolved.

To strengthen the governance arrangements for mutual legal assistance requests, a team from the Law Officers of the Crown and BLE developed a memorandum of understanding between the two parties. The memorandum, signed by Her Majesty's

Procureur and the head of BLE in September 2019, sets appropriate time limits for each stage in the process.

We found that both parties are complying with the memorandum and that the delays have been resolved.

## Judgment

The Law Officers of the Crown and BLE's actions have addressed this recommendation.

## Recommendation 3

By 31 January 2019, the head of law enforcement should design and implement an action plan to improve the quality of BLE's victim care, including more widespread use of care plans and victim personal statements, and renewed efforts to relocate the video interview suite.

## Background

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) included how BLE supports victims of crime.

BLE doesn't have to comply with the statutory *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime* that applies to forces in England and Wales. However, BLE leaders recognise the importance of victim care and had committed BLE to voluntarily adopting the code.

We found evidence of good victim care in most investigations conducted by BLE's PPU. However, in other BLE investigations, it wasn't always apparent that victim and witness care plans were routinely completed.

We also found that BLE wasn't routinely offering victims the opportunity to make a victim personal statement.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, the suite where BLE conducted its video interviews with vulnerable victims to achieve best evidence (a police protocol known as ABE) wasn't fit for purpose. Shortcomings included:

- a lack of disability access (the suite was on the first floor); and
- interference from background noise outside the suite, which interfered with recordings, making them unclear.

At the time of the inspection, BLE had applied to the 'Seized Asset Fund' to move the suite to more suitable premises.

We concluded that an action plan was needed to address the various shortcomings of BLE's victim care provision.

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<sup>4</sup> A victim personal statement provides the victim with an opportunity to describe the wider effects of the crime upon them, express their concerns and indicate whether they need any support. This can strengthen prosecution evidence and make clear to the offender the consequences and gravity of their behaviour.

## Our findings in 2019

BLE has resolved the concerns we raised about the ABE suite, which has been relocated. It now has disabled access and isn't affected by background noise.

However, BLE hasn't developed a dedicated action plan to improve the quality of victim care. It should do more to make sure that officers give all victims the appropriate level of care.

We examined several recent cases conducted by the PPU, the criminal investigation department (CID) and response officers. We saw evidence of investigators providing good victim care and regularly contacting victims in all the PPU and CID cases. Conversely, many response officers' case files lacked evidence that they regularly update victims. There are several causes.

- BLE's senior management team has voluntarily committed to adopting the *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime* but hasn't integrated this with its policies. This is an understandable decision, as some aspects don't suit BLE's operational environment. However, BLE hasn't developed a victim care policy or procedure based on those aspects of the code that could be adopted in Guernsey, including those relating to victim contact. In the absence of such a policy, response officers are unclear as to when victims should be contacted.
- BLE's crime management system doesn't alert officers when victim updates are due, unlike the crime and case management systems used by many police forces in England and Wales.
- Response supervisors don't routinely monitor victim contact.

We found similar problems with the use of victim impact statements (VISs).<sup>5</sup>

The [\*Code of Practice for Victims of Crime\*](#) states that victims are "entitled to be offered the opportunity to make a victim personal statement at the same time as giving a witness statement". Many response officers weren't aware that all victims should be given the opportunity to make a VIS.

In addition, Guernsey's version of NICHE can't flag whether a VIS has been offered or given. (NICHE is BLE's computerised record management system.) Supervisors or auditors are therefore unable to determine from NICHE whether investigators have offered VISs or not.

To improve the level of care given to victims, BLE should:

- produce a victim care policy, based on aspects of the *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime* that can be applied in the Guernsey context; and
- introduce a system on NICHE to capture the use of VISs, so that their use is subject to audit and performance management.

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<sup>5</sup> The name for victim personal statements in Guernsey.

## Judgment

The head of law enforcement has made limited progress in addressing the recommendation by relocating and improving the video interview suite. However, our recommendation remains outstanding. BLE should produce a victim care policy to help make sure that officers give a consistently good level of victim care.

## Recommendation 4

By 31 January 2019, the head of BLE should carry out an evaluation of reported domestic violence incidents in the Bailiwick of Guernsey. Based on this data, the most appropriate agency should conduct an evaluation to establish whether DVPOs and DVPNs, if they had been available, would have provided valuable additional protection to victims. If the evaluation shows that they would, the Committee for Home Affairs should consider pursuing changes to legislation to enable their introduction as soon as possible thereafter.

## Background

[Our 2018 report](#) described how [DVPOs and DVPNs](#) are powers police officers in England and Wales can use to protect victims of domestic abuse.

DVPOs and DVPNs provide similar powers to emergency banning orders, which are used in many European jurisdictions and recommended by the Council of Europe. However, there is no equivalent in Guernsey law.

Consequently, BLE and the courts are unable to provide victims of domestic violence in the Bailiwick of Guernsey with the level of protection provided to victims of domestic violence elsewhere.

## Our findings in 2019

The States' domestic abuse strategy team worked with BLE and other government departments to address this recommendation. They evaluated whether DVPOs and DVPNs would support victims of domestic violence, or whether the use of such orders and notices would duplicate support that is already available.

In July 2019, their evaluation report concluded that DVPOs and DVPNs would be beneficial. It recommended that the Committee for Home Affairs draft a policy letter to introduce them in the Bailiwick.

The Committee for Home Affairs accepted the findings of the evaluation and is now consulting the governments of Alderney and Sark. When they have completed the consultation in 2020, they plan to submit a policy letter to the [States of Deliberation](#).

## Judgment

The head of law enforcement and the Committee for Home Affairs' actions have addressed this recommendation.

## Recommendation 5

By 31 January 2019, the Committee for Home Affairs should publish a strategic plan that sets out BLE's business objectives and priorities. BLE should use this to inform a revised service delivery plan.

### Background

[In 2018, the Committee for Home Affairs didn't have a plan that set out BLE's priorities](#). In the absence of such a plan, BLE created eight service delivery priorities and included them in its [Service Delivery Plan 2017–2020](#).

### Our findings in 2019

The Committee for Home Affairs published its [Delivery Plan 2019–2022](#) in 2019. It includes its priorities for the next three years. However, it doesn't set out priorities or objectives for BLE or other Home Affairs operational agencies.<sup>6</sup> In the absence of strategic direction from the Committee for Home Affairs, BLE has again created its own priorities and objectives, outlined in its draft *Service Delivery Plan 2020–2023*.

The Committee for Home Affairs recognises the importance of its role in setting strategic priorities and objectives for policing in Guernsey, as well as outlining the strategic direction for BLE. In July 2019, the Committee for Home Affairs president reinforced her commitment, when she signed the *Protocol concerning the relationship between the Committee for Home Affairs and the head of law enforcement and implementing Recommendation 6 of the HMICFRS report 2018*.

The protocol, also signed by the head of law enforcement, sets out their respective responsibilities for:

- objective and priority setting;
- strategic governance and oversight;
- operational direction and control;
- independence; and
- provision of performance information for governance purposes.

The Committee for Home Affairs' first responsibility under the protocol is to set the objectives and priorities for BLE and, in conjunction with the head of law enforcement, set performance targets for BLE through the Committee for Home Affairs' delivery plan and priorities matrix.

The Committee for Home Affairs recognises that setting the objectives and priorities for BLE gives it a foundation on which it can develop BLE's estates, people and ICT strategies. However, developing a set of strategic objectives and priorities that reflect the risks Guernsey faces, as well as the concerns of its population, isn't a simple task. It needs an evidence base to inform decision making.

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<sup>6</sup> We note that the Committee published an updated Home Affairs Delivery Plan in 2020, following the inspection, which seeks, in part, to address the gaps in strategic direction and objectives.

BLE's ongoing work to develop a strategic threat and risk assessment (see area for improvement 1, below) and improve community consultation (see recommendation 6, below) should provide this (when they are complete). The Committee for Home Affairs may also find it beneficial to talk to police and crime commissioners in England and Wales, to learn about their statutory responsibilities to issue policing and crime plans.

## Judgment

The new protocol is a welcome development, as it clarifies the Committee for Home Affairs' responsibilities, including setting objectives and priorities for BLE.

We are aware that the Committee for Home Affairs currently lacks information to base a strategy on. Until BLE has generated such information and the Committee for Home Affairs has generated objectives and priorities, this recommendation remains outstanding.

## Recommendation 6

By 31 January 2019, the Committee for Home Affairs, in consultation with the head of law enforcement, should design, publish, and subsequently operate in accordance with, a document that clarifies each party's responsibilities for (as a minimum): objective and priority setting; strategic governance and oversight; operational direction and control; independence; and provision of performance information for governance purposes.

## Background

[In 2018, there was a strong sense of frustration, shared equally by the Committee for Home Affairs and BLE personnel, that governance arrangements weren't functioning as well as they should.](#)

There was no protocol of the kind used in England and Wales, or other document, to clarify the roles of the Committee for Home Affairs and the head of law enforcement.

We found that although the Committee for Home Affairs meetings dealt with important work – such as approving equipment purchases and challenging the details of changes to policy and procedure – too much time was taken up in (what appeared to be) tactical and day-to-day operational policing. Operational policing should be the preserve of the head of law enforcement.

## Our findings in 2019

The States commissioned an independent governance review of the Committee for Home Affairs following the publication of our 2018 report.<sup>7</sup> It [published its findings in July 2019](#) and made three recommendations related to the issues we raised:

1. The Committee should work with civil servants and heads of service to redefine the boundaries between their strategic roles and responsibilities and the responsibilities of civil servants and operational heads of service. This should

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<sup>7</sup> The Review of the Committee for Home Affairs was part of a series of governance reviews, designed to provide the underpinning knowledge and evidence for a governance development programme, with supporting guidance, for deputies.



include, agreed and collaborative approaches to managing issues that have both strategic and operational elements.

2. A Protocol should be agreed, to set out clearly the boundaries between the Committee and the Head of BLE. Although not required by Recommendation 6 of the HMICFRS Report 2018, it would be good practice for the Committee to agree a similar document with the other heads of service, as they have also experienced behaviour on the part of the Committee which has crossed the line between the Committee's strategic responsibilities and their operational responsibilities. A draft Protocol has been written by the reviewer, which specifies how the Committee should distinguish between strategic and operational issues. That has now been passed to the Chief Secretary to the Committee to manage the process of consultation and discussion between all the parties. The Committee should adopt the final, agreed version of the Protocol – and abide by it.

3. The Committee should work with staff to build new relationships of mutual trust and respect. This will require the Committee to recognise the validity of the evidence that its governance is not currently good enough.

In July 2019, the head of BLE and the chair of the Committee for Home Affairs also signed the *Protocol concerning the relationship between the Committee for Home Affairs and the head of law enforcement and implementing Recommendation 6 of the HMICFRS report 2018* in response to the review and its recommendations.

As outlined in the section on Recommendation 5, above, the Committee for Home Affairs is still working to set BLE's strategic direction and objectives. Aside from this, members of the Committee for Home Affairs, BLE's senior leaders and key stakeholders in other government departments appear confident that both the Committee for Home Affairs and head of law enforcement are fulfilling their responsibilities.

While our 2018 inspection report highlighted that the Committee for Home Affairs was taking up too much time in (what appeared to be) tactical and day-to-day operational policing, interested parties are confident that this has changed. People we spoke to from BLE, the Committee for Home Affairs and the States also felt that the working relationship between the Committee for Home Affairs and BLE had improved considerably since our previous inspection.

The protocol states that it will be reviewed annually by the Committee for Home Affairs and the head of law enforcement. It is an important document that captures the finding of our inspection and the independent governance review of the Committee for Home Affairs. It is crucial that its insights aren't lost in the future, when current Committee for Home Affairs members and BLE's senior managers have left their roles. We therefore suggest that the protocol becomes part of Bailiwick law.

## **Judgment**

The Committee for Home Affairs and head of law enforcement have addressed the recommendation through the development of the protocol and their compliance with it. However, the Committee for Home Affairs should consider making the protocol part of Bailiwick law.

## Recommendation 7

By 31 January 2019, the head of law enforcement should ensure that information on Guernsey Border Agency's complaints procedure is made available to the public and is easily accessible.

### Background

[In 2018, neither the Guernsey Border Agency page of the States' website nor the Guernsey Police website described how to make a complaint against the Guernsey Border Agency.](#)

### Our findings in 2019

Guernsey Border Agency has added a link to its complaints procedures on [its States' website page](#) and prominently displays information about complaints procedures in the public areas of its premises.

### Judgment

BLE has addressed this recommendation.

## Recommendation 8

By 31 January 2019, the head of law enforcement should ensure that retrospective vetting is carried out on all staff recruited before the current vetting policy was introduced.

### Background

We examined BLE's staff vetting procedures in [our 2017–18 inspection](#).

BLE had suitable initial vetting arrangements in place. All officers, staff, volunteers and contractors were being vetted before taking up post; and contractors weren't permitted access to premises until the vetting process was complete.

However, the vetting unit hadn't applied this policy retrospectively to people in post prior to its launch in 2012. We concluded that this should be done as a matter of urgency.

### Our findings in 2019

BLE reviewed the vetting status of its workforce after our 2017–18 inspection. It identified officers and support staff who hadn't been subject to the vetting process introduced in 2012. During the first half of 2019, these people were retrospectively vetted. Everyone passed the process.

The vetting unit has also:

- staggered future vetting review dates to make sure it will have the capacity to conduct the reviews; and
- set alerts to remind staff of future review dates.

These measures should help prevent any recurrence of the problems encountered between 2012 and 2018.

**Judgment**

The head of law enforcement has addressed this recommendation.

# Progress against areas for improvement

Of our 26 recommendations, we consider 9 have been dealt with fully, and there has been progress on a further 16 and 1 remains outstanding.

## Area for improvement 1

BLE's understanding of demand is an area for improvement. Regular production of a strategic threat and risk assessment would improve BLE's understanding and therefore assist in strategic planning.

### Background

We evaluated BLE's understanding of demand in [our 2017–18 inspection](#).

BLE used a series of methods to understand much of the demand it faced. However, it didn't have a process for regularly collecting data from a wide range of internal and external sources (including other parts of the States) to compile a comprehensive annual strategic threat and risk assessment.

A well-constructed strategic threat and risk assessment uses information from law enforcement and other sources to create a complete view of demand. Sources could include social services; health; fire and rescue; transport providers; and demographic data.

We concluded that such an assessment would be a valuable (additional) source of reference for BLE's leaders.

### Our findings in 2019

BLE has conducted a range of activity aimed at improving its understanding of its demand since we published our 2018 report. For example, it has conducted an internal demand management review.

But, BLE hasn't produced the strategic threat and risk assessment suggested in this area for improvement. A project to create one has been delayed partly because it can't access the data needed for the assessment. BLE lacks the business intelligence software that could automatically extract relevant data from its IT systems, as well as the capacity to extract and analyse the data manually.

As part of the ongoing ICT improvement programmes across Home Affairs (see area for improvement 26, below), BLE has specified which features / functionality it would need from business intelligence software. It plans to continue to develop its strategic threat and risk assessment when such software is in place. However, problems with BLE's ICT infrastructure make it unclear when that software will be available.

## Judgment

ICT problems have hampered BLE's ability to produce a strategic threat and risk assessment. Consequently, BLE's understanding of demand remains an area for improvement.

## Area for improvement 2

BLE's arrangements for formal public consultation and communication are an area for improvement. BLE should introduce a structure and system for consulting and communicating with the public on matters such as strategic and local priorities, matters of concern to communities and feedback on BLE actions and performance.

## Background

[In 2018, we said that BLE could do more to consult with the public and involve them in setting local and strategic priorities.](#)

BLE didn't formally consult parish contacts (such as parish constables and douzaines<sup>8</sup>) when producing the [Service Delivery Plan 2017–2020](#). Nor did it hold regular local parish meetings where the community could raise issues of concern with neighbourhood officers.

There was no structure in place for BLE to consult the public about their concerns and priorities, or to feed back what it had done to address them.

Nor were there regular surveys to understand the public's priorities, their views on the organisation's strategic direction, or perceptions of its performance (although the biennial [Crime and Justice Survey](#) included some questions relating to BLE).

## Our findings in 2019

BLE has developed arrangements for formal public consultation and communication since we published our 2018 report. However, there is more it could do.

Neighbourhood policing is under-resourced in Guernsey, with no officers assigned to seven of the ten parishes. Consequently, BLE officers don't regularly engage with the community, attend parish meetings or conduct (the wide range of) community policing duties in large parts of Guernsey, including inter-agency problem solving.

The most important development has been the re-establishment of the BLE Public Consultative Group, now rebranded the community advisory group.

BLE established a community advisory group in Alderney in 2018. It was based on an officer's experience of similar police consultative groups in England and Wales. The group has a broad membership including the chief executive of the States of Alderney; representatives from the Alderney Chamber of Commerce and the Youth Commission for Guernsey and Alderney; and local charities, schools, churches and the airport.

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<sup>8</sup> Parish constables, or connétables, are the elected heads of parishes. Parish councils in Guernsey are known as douzaines.

BLE conducted community surveys across Alderney after the first meeting. It asked people whether they felt safe and gave them the opportunity to share their community safety concerns. BLE used the survey results, along with input from the advisory group members, to set neighbourhood priorities for Alderney. They were reviewed in the next meeting.

The quarterly meetings give members the opportunity to raise issues and share community safety priorities with BLE. And they give BLE the opportunity to feed back on its activities and performance, as well as what it has done to address issues raised in previous meetings.

In addition to the formal community advisory group meetings, BLE's neighbourhood officers in Alderney attend parish meetings. They are in regular contact with group members and the wider public.

The initiative to establish a community advisory group in Alderney received very positive feedback from its members. BLE established a similar group in Guernsey in mid-2019. It invited representatives from 40 charities and other third sector organisations.

As in Alderney, partner agencies have welcomed the creation of the Guernsey community advisory group. It is recognised as giving the public and community groups a voice and opportunity to be involved in decisions and actions that affect them.

BLE also has regular meetings with Guernsey's douzaines, constables and a range of other partner agencies. Despite this, BLE carries out a narrower range of public consultation in Guernsey than in Alderney.

The community surveys conducted in Alderney haven't been replicated in Guernsey. BLE's senior management team recognises that reallocating posts from neighbourhood policing to response and specialist investigation has left neighbourhood policing underfunded. They are keen to re-build it so that BLE can carry out public consultation and problem-solving policing.

### **New area for improvement 1**

BLE's neighbourhood policing capability is an area for improvement. BLE should seek to expand its neighbourhood policing footprint to all Guernsey parishes to improve community policing, problem solving and community engagement.

### **Judgment**

BLE has strengthened its arrangements for formal public consultation and communication on strategic and local priorities; matters of concern to communities; and feedback on BLE's actions and performance. However, neighbourhood policing is under-resourced and therefore community engagement remains an area for improvement in some parts of Guernsey.

## Area for improvement 3

BLE's lack of a process for assessing the effect of abstractions is an area for improvement; BLE should introduce such a process in order to minimise the risks associated with abstracting personnel from their core role.

### Background

[Our 2018 report](#) said that BLE didn't assess the impact of abstracting (taking away) police officers from their primary roles – in particular, abstractions from neighbourhood teams and roads policing roles to support other units. Such assessments are important because risks can arise where abstracted staff are unavailable to fulfil other commitments.

### Our findings in 2019

Since we published our 2018 report, BLE has sought to monitor the scale of abstractions by:

- regularly reviewing data on its resource management system, and sickness and overtime reports; and
- making it a standing agenda item at workforce planning meetings.

It has also sought to reduce abstractions through a range of initiatives including:

- revising its recruitment strategy;
- recruiting officers with transferable skills;
- initiating a recruitment drive for special constables; and
- creating a planning and events inspector post.

However, abstractions remain a significant issue, especially at sergeant and inspector ranks.

Abstracting police officers from specialist teams to temporarily backfill response has a significantly detrimental impact. Specialist teams often have high workloads and don't have the capacity to absorb abstractions.

BLE should regularly assess the impact of abstractions in terms of the work that won't be done when an officer temporarily moves to another role. The impact of such decisions should be based on prioritisation and risk.

### Judgment

While BLE has sought to reduce abstractions, its lack of a process for assessing the effect of abstractions is an area for improvement.

## Area for improvement 4

The timely availability of occupational health services is an area for improvement.

## Background

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) evaluated wellbeing provisions for BLE staff, including the arrangements for occupational health services.

BLE's occupational health was provided through a centralised States of Guernsey arrangement. We found that it could be difficult for BLE staff to obtain occupational health services when they needed it, because the service wasn't based in the Bailiwick. In some cases, this delayed employees' return to work.

Being pragmatic, BLE had occasionally paid for staff to have medical treatment that would enable them to resume their duties.

## Our findings in 2019

Since our report, BLE has met with the States' human resources team and other government departments to try to resolve this issue, but without success. The meetings confirmed that BLE is unable to change its occupational health arrangements as it is bound by States-wide occupational health contracts.

## Judgment

The timely availability of occupational health services remains an area for improvement. However, there are constraints on what more BLE can do to improve this, as it is subject to the States-wide occupational health contracts.

## Area for improvement 5

BLE's compliance with the crime recording rules is an area for improvement. Thorough implementation of the new crime recording policy and performance monitoring, BLE should secure improvements in crime data integrity.

## Background

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) included a crime file review that identified problems with the organisation's crime recording practices. In several instances, offences and detections hadn't been recorded.

BLE was trying to address these issues. It had introduced a new crime recording policy in January 2018, which largely reflected the National Crime Recording Standard and Home Office Counting Rules.

BLE had also started to develop a performance regime to assure compliance with the rules. It was a performance indicator in its [Service Delivery Plan 2017–2020](#).

## Our findings in 2019

Since we published our 2018 report, BLE has trained officers on its new crime recording policy. It has also created audit and review mechanisms to monitor and increase compliance. They are:

- quarterly audits focused on whether all crime-related incidents are accurately recorded and closed in compliance with policy; and



- quarterly governance meetings (and more, if needed) to review audit results and address any related issues.

A recent audit highlighted that many harassment incidents were being mis-recorded. To address this, an officer will visit an English police force to learn how it records similar offences and will use what they learn to produce guidance for BLE officers.

### **Judgment**

BLE has improved compliance with crime recording rules and, therefore, crime data integrity.

## **Area for improvement 6**

BLE's external communication activities are an area for improvement. Working closely with the Committee for Home Affairs, BLE should make more effective use of external communications to challenge inaccurate public perceptions of crime levels.

### **Background**

[Our 2018 report](#) said that recorded crime statistics suggested a clear trend of reducing crime. However, that didn't always result in the public perceiving the Bailiwick of Guernsey as a low-crime, safe haven.

As in many small communities, most incidents of crime or anti-social behaviour in Guernsey are reported by the local media – irrespective of their severity. This can create the impression that crime is rife, when it isn't.

BLE could do more to reassure the public that crime in the Bailiwick of Guernsey is low. It could do this through increased public engagement and more effective use of communications channels such as its social media accounts. The Committee for Home Affairs could also play a role in this.

### **Our findings in 2019**

BLE has sought to change public perceptions of crime levels in Guernsey since we published our 2018 report.

It has appointed a full-time communications officer and developed a new approach to communications, focused more on the use of social media rather than traditional media. This is giving BLE greater control of its communication. The Guernsey Police Twitter account has 18,500 followers. This has given BLE greater control over its communications output, as it no longer relies on the media to relay its messages.

The 2020 crime survey will give valuable insight on whether it has been successful.

### **Judgment**

BLE has improved communications activities by making more effective use of external and social media to challenge public perceptions of crime levels.

## Area for improvement 7

BLE's scrutiny of problem-solving policing plans is an area for improvement. BLE should carry out formal reviews of each plan's effectiveness in addition to the oversight by the 'Optimum' meetings.

### Background

Although BLE reviewed some high-profile problem-solving enforcement activity at its fortnightly 'Optimum' performance meetings, no formal results analysis of the effectiveness of problem-solving plans was carried out.

### Our findings in 2019

Neighbourhood teams are taking responsibility for most problem-solving plans. Sergeants regularly review their actions.

The force now analyses actions taken as part of problem-solving plans, and their effect on the underlying problem. This forms part of a more formal review process which determines if further action is needed or if the problem has largely been solved.

### Judgment

BLE has improved scrutiny of the effectiveness of problem-solving plans.

## Area for improvement 8

The range of crime prevention advice on the Guernsey Police website is an area for improvement. BLE should add relevant advice to the site, including links to other relevant sites which offer advice.

### Background

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) evaluated how BLE provided crime prevention advice to the population of the Bailiwick of Guernsey.

BLE was giving helpful crime prevention advice through a range of communication channels including local print, broadcast and social media, as well as engaging directly with the business community.

However, crime prevention advice on the Guernsey Police website only covered "getting safe online". There was scope for it to provide a broader range of crime prevention advice.

### Our findings

Since we published our 2018 report, Guernsey Police has redesigned its website.

The new website includes a page on crime prevention and reduction advice – for example, how to prevent burglaries. The site also includes a link to the Guernsey Crime Prevention Panel's 2015 [Official Guernsey Crime Prevention Handbook](#).

## Judgment

BLE has increased the range of crime prevention advice on the Guernsey Police website.

## Area for improvement 9

BLE's strategic approach to tackling anti-social behaviour is an area for improvement. BLE should put in place measures to improve incident recording and performance management.

## Background

[Our 2018 report](#) highlighted shortcomings with BLE's strategic approach to tackling anti-social behaviour.

Guernsey Police's 2013–2016 business plan highlighted that the need to regularly review the effectiveness of responses to anti-social behaviour was an important action for the force. However, there was no mention of it in BLE's [Service Delivery Plan 2017–2020](#) and we didn't find evidence that any such regular review was being conducted.

Our 2018 report explained that an understanding of any trends in anti-social behaviour would be central to an informed assessment of whether police activity was having the desired effect. However, such incidents weren't being recorded on BLE's NICHE computerised records management system,<sup>9</sup> which meant that it lacked data.

Additionally, there was no mention of anti-social behaviour in any of the senior management team meeting agendas we reviewed.

## Our findings in 2019

Since the initial inspection, BLE's senior leadership team has placed greater emphasis on dealing with anti-social behaviour. It has put measures in place to improve the recording of anti-social behaviour incidents, and performance management.

Officers now record anti-social behaviour incidents on NICHE. This enables BLE's crime analyst to produce geo-mapping and time analysis of anti-social behaviour incidents. Such analyses are presented at BLE's fortnightly Optimum meetings. They have been used to direct specific operations targeting the perpetrators of anti-social behaviour.

## Judgment

This area for improvement has been addressed.

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<sup>9</sup> The NICHE records management system is also used by a several police forces in the UK and elsewhere.

## Area for improvement 10

The Joint Emergency Services Control Centre's (JESCC's) Vision emergency dispatch software and performance management framework are areas for improvement. BLE should ensure that these areas are addressed in any future equipment upgrades or capital investment plans for JESCC.

### Background

Guernsey's JESCC isn't part of BLE. It is the responsibility of the Committee for Home Affairs.

JESCC handles emergency calls for Guernsey Police, Guernsey Fire and Rescue Service, the St John Emergency Ambulance Service and the Guernsey Coastguard.

[We reported in 2018](#) that JESCC was a good example of a multi-agency arrangement that works well, but there were areas for improvement relating to its software and performance management framework.

JESCC had a call-handling system called ProQA and a CAD (computer aided dispatch) software solution called Vision. ProQA generated the pre-set list of questions asked of callers to the service. However, since these were designed for law enforcement in the USA, some weren't suitable for the Bailiwick of Guernsey.

JESCC didn't have a performance management framework. Important management information, such as the average time taken to answer emergency calls and the volume of abandoned emergency calls, wasn't routinely monitored.

### Our findings in 2019

Since we published our 2018 report, work has taken place to improve the stability of JESCC's ICT platforms as part of the Committee for Home Affairs' ICT recovery plan. (See area for improvement 26, below.)

Under this plan, work to address problems with the control centre's hardware and connectivity is a priority. Until the infrastructure is stable, changes can't be made to software – problems with the ProQA question sets can't be resolved until the stabilisation work has been completed.

At the time of our revisit, BLE was preparing to sign off this element of the recovery plan and had started to consider how to resolve the problems with the ProQA question sets.

The inflexibility of ProQA's question sets became more problematic early in 2019 when BLE introduced the THRIVE assessment tool.

THRIVE is a risk assessment tool widely used by police forces in England and Wales to prioritise the initial response to incidents. It helps call handlers:

- risk assess calls;
- record their judgment against the THRIVE elements on the call log; and

- prioritise the force's initial response appropriately.<sup>10</sup>

ProQA can't facilitate this approach as:

- its question sets don't correspond to THRIVE's five elements;
- the way it identifies vulnerability doesn't correspond with BLE's new vulnerability definition; and
- call handlers can't record their THRIVE assessments on the call log.

JESCC has developed a temporary process to mitigate these problems which involves:

- call handlers completing the ProQA questions;
- ProQA suggesting an appropriate initial policing response; and
- the force incident manager conducting a separate THRIVE assessment on the same call which overrides the response generated by ProQA.

JESCC is aware of the inefficiency of this process. It is evaluating the benefits of amending the ProQA question set or buying an alternative system once the ICT network has been stabilised.

Our 2018 report also highlighted JESCC's performance management framework as an area for improvement. This hasn't been resolved.

While the JESCC manager now monitors a suite of performance indicators, including the time taken to answer emergency calls for police help and the volume of abandoned emergency calls, such data isn't reported to senior managers at the JESCC steering group.

Data is only presented to senior management if the JESCC manager identifies a problem. Senior management should review key performance information regularly to effectively oversee JESCC's activity.

## **Judgment**

JESCC's emergency dispatch software and performance management framework remain areas for improvement. While BLE can't look to resolve the problems with ProQA until the ICT recovery programme has been completed, there are no barriers preventing the JESCC steering group regularly reviewing key performance information.

## **Area for improvement 11**

The consistency of supervision for criminal investigations is an area for improvement. BLE should set clear expectations for supervisors about the frequency and depth of supervision required, training them if necessary. Inspectors should carry out regular dip checking to provide assurance that these expectations are met.

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<sup>10</sup> This initial THRIVE assessment is subsequently re-assessed as needed.

## Background

[Our 2018 report](#) highlighted shortcomings with the supervision of some criminal investigations. We found good-quality investigation plans for most of the investigations we examined. And investigations were often well supervised in specialist departments. However, the quality of supervision wasn't as consistent outside these specialist departments.

Because of this, BLE's criminal justice unit – whose role should have been administrative rather than supervisory – had taken on a *de facto* quality assurance role to ensure that investigations were conducted effectively and met prosecution standards.

Prosecutors had also identified consistent shortcomings in investigations and provided additional training to investigators in subjects including disclosure and identification procedures.

We concluded that effective supervision was especially important in low-crime environments such as the Bailiwick of Guernsey, where investigators have fewer opportunities to build the skills and experience they need to be effective.

## Our findings in 2019

Since our 2017–18 inspection, BLE has produced an *Investigatory Procedures Guidance* document. It gives supervisors clear expectations about the frequency and depth of supervision required (of them). However, many uniformed supervisors aren't abiding by the guidance. Therefore, it hasn't improved the supervision of investigations conducted by response officers.

When we examined a sample of investigations, we found that specialist departments conduct good, well-supervised investigations. However, this wasn't the case with investigations conducted by response officers.

Many investigations handed over to the force's investigation support unit (ISU) from response officers and supervisors were poor quality. Most didn't have robust initial investigation plans and, in many, a range of early investigative opportunities had been missed.

In some cases, officers hadn't secured CCTV. In others, they hadn't taken witness details or accounts. Such cases aren't being supervised appropriately at the scene of the crime and handovers aren't being checked by shift supervisors.

Shortly before our revisit, BLE changed its process to include a new case handover form. It sets out the actions that constitute a good initial investigation. We read the form and it is good.

Response officers must now complete the form, outlining actions taken, before a case is transferred to ISU. The quality of cases passed to ISU has improved since the form was introduced. However, by the time a handover form has been completed, the opportunity to conduct initial investigative actions could have been missed. The new form is a good step but doesn't replace the need for robust supervision.

It is imperative that response officers have the training and skills they need to conduct their investigations. Most response officers hadn't had recent training on conducting investigations. Some hadn't had investigation training since their probation. Probation training is basic – without refresher training, investigative skills aren't developed and new procedures aren't learnt.

As there are relatively few crimes in Guernsey, officers have limited opportunities to practise and develop their investigative skills. Poor supervision almost certainly means that officers aren't receiving the mentoring they need to become more effective investigators.

### **New recommendation**

By 1 May 2021, the BLE's senior leadership team should make sure that all response officers have received PIP 1 investigation training.

BLE still lacks robust processes to monitor and assure investigatory quality. Inspectors aren't regularly dip checking investigations. BLE should amend its case management policy to facilitate this kind of auditing.

Under the current policy, none of the following is recorded on NICHE, BLE's computerised records management system:

- tasks given to officers;
- supervisors' comments about such tasks; or
- ISU's comments on the quality of investigations.

Consequently, poor investigatory practice or poor supervision can't be identified by auditing NICHE records.

We are concerned that, despite ISU highlighting the shortcomings of initial investigations to managers, the issue isn't being addressed by the force at a strategic level.

### **Judgment**

The consistency of supervision for criminal investigations remains an area for improvement, especially in response.

## **Area for improvement 12**

The quality of continuous professional development for investigators in specialist units is an area for improvement. The Committee for Home Affairs and BLE should ensure that all such officers are provided with sufficient access to development opportunities.

### **Background**

We found inconsistencies in the continuous professional development and ongoing training provided to BLE's detectives in [our 2017–18 inspection](#).

This had resulted in some officers having to investigate serious crimes without adequate knowledge of how to do so, creating risk to the success of investigations and reputational risk to BLE.

We recognise that providing regular training and continuous professional development takes significant financial commitment. There weren't enough resources to provide consistent continuous professional development to all specialist investigators. BLE had sought to address this by negotiating with a major training provider to try to secure lower prices.

Despite its efforts, there were inconsistencies in the provision of continuous professional development. There needed to be a better investment in officers' development.

### **Our findings in 2019**

Some investigators in specialist units have received professional development training since we published our 2018 report. However, training provision remains ad hoc. Investigators don't have access to the PIP accreditation and continuous professional development that their counterparts in England and Wales do.

While PIP accreditation would be desirable, BLE is exploring whether officers investigate enough serious crimes to develop the mandatory portfolio of investigation that forms part of the accreditation process. It is researching other ways to provide officers with continuous professional development if PIP accreditation isn't achievable.

During 2019, the Committee for Home Affairs secured an increase to BLE's training budget. Although there are competing demands for this funding it should be used for greater investment in continuous professional development.

### **Judgment**

Work to resolve this area for improvement is ongoing.

### **Area for improvement 13**

Guernsey Border Agency's capability to carry out automatic checks of passenger and freight manifests against relevant law enforcement intelligence databases is an area for improvement. Improvements to this capability – and in access to the Police National Database – should feature in BLE's ICT investment and development proposals.

### **Background**

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) highlighted that BLE lacked access to systems that would help Guernsey Border Agency detection officers target customs searches and other border checks.

An internal review in 2015 recommended that BLE apply to the Service Guernsey Digital Innovation Fund for money to set up a borders profiling hub. The intention was to automate border checks. At the time of the inspection, BLE was exploring whether UK authorities could help them.



Guernsey Border Agency officers and Guernsey police colleagues also lacked access to the Police National Database, a particularly rich source of UK police intelligence.

## **Our findings**

BLE is still unable to access the Police National Database. This is because BLE's ICT infrastructure still doesn't comply with the standards that would allow it access to the network that hosts the Police National Database. A joint project managed by the States' ICT, that includes senior representation from BLE, is responsible for improving the ICT infrastructure. It has appropriate governance arrangements in place – for example, an action plan that is updated regularly. ICT infrastructure also features on BLE's strategic risk register.

BLE planned to re-apply for accreditation once the ICT infrastructure had been stabilised. BLE gained accreditation shortly after our inspection fieldwork and is now working with representatives from Police National Database to gain access to that system. This process may now take up to two years

BLE is also trying to purchase software to automate the checks of passenger and freight manifests. It applied to the ICT minor capital board for funding in June 2019. The board hadn't ruled on whether the application would be approved at the time of our inspection. However, at a recent meeting between BLE and Jersey Customs & Immigration Service, they discussed the potential to develop a collaborative solution to automate checks of passenger and freight manifests – and both are keen to pursue it.

## **Judgment**

Automatic checks and access to the Police National Database remain areas for improvement, although the required capability features in BLE's ICT investment and development proposals.

## **Area for improvement 14**

BLE's understanding of its performance concerning smuggling and the unlawful supply of controlled drugs is an area for improvement. BLE should develop a more comprehensive performance framework which draws on all available data from law enforcement and other sources.

## **Background**

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) revealed that BLE lacked a robust means to measure its performance in preventing drug smuggling and the unlawful supply of controlled drugs.

BLE based its understanding of performance in this area on the street price of drugs. However, there was scope for it to develop a more comprehensive framework to measure its performance on drug trafficking into the Bailiwick of Guernsey.

The framework could draw on a range of data, including the numbers of drug arrests, drug-related deaths, drug-related hospital admissions and public perceptions of availability of drugs, as well as seizure and street price information.

## Our findings in 2019

BLE has been working with partners in other government departments to develop a more comprehensive assessment of the availability and misuse of controlled drugs in the Bailiwick of Guernsey.

BLE representatives and partner agencies exchange data relating to substance misuse in a range of workgroups. BLE has a close working relationship with the director of public health, who facilitates information sharing from multiple sources through the substance misuse forum. However, the information sharing is ad hoc – it would be good to establish a formal information sharing agreement.

A joint substance misuse steering group was established in 2019, including BLE and attendees from the States of Guernsey Health and Social Care. The group is developing datasets to assess the scale of the use of controlled drugs. And it seeks to formalise information sharing.

Ultimately, this will give BLE a better picture of drug smuggling and misuse. Before that can happen, the composition of the datasets must be agreed. BLE also needs business intelligence software that can draw data from its systems and those of partner agencies. (Our update on recommendation 13 says that BLE lacks this software: see above.)

## Judgment

Work by BLE and partner agencies to address this area for improvement is ongoing.

## Area for improvement 15

The THEMIS system is an area for improvement. THEMIS requires system upgrades to make it stable and reliable, and to enable its use for intelligence development and analysis purposes. These should include automated and live-time data matching with other sources of law enforcement intelligence and the other improvements specified in the business case.

## Background

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) highlighted problems with THEMIS, the computer system that financial institutions use to submit SARs.<sup>11</sup>

THEMIS was unreliable. There were periods when it had been offline. This inhibited financial institutions' ability to submit SARs. Its configuration didn't make it easy for staff in the economic crime division to export data for analysis. The system was also prone to crash when they tried to perform searches.

A 2016 business case outlined the enhancements that THEMIS needed. However, no financing had been secured to improve THEMIS at the time of

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<sup>11</sup> Suspicious activity reports (SARs) are reports from financial and other institutions which alert law enforcement agencies that certain client/customer activity is in some way suspicious and might indicate money laundering or terrorist financing.

our inspection. All requests for new or upgraded software were on hold pending completion of the ICT recovery programme.

THEMIS was only fit for purpose in a limited number of respects. There were important things it couldn't do.

### **Our findings in 2019**

THEMIS users are still experiencing the problems we highlighted in 2018. However, considerable progress has been made to resolve them.

In 2019, the States' policy and resources committee accepted BLE's business case and funding bid for THEMIS development.

Now that most of the work in the ICT recovery plan has been completed, the States' new ICT provider has started to upgrade the server hosting THEMIS and to install the latest THEMIS software updates (see area for improvement 26, below). This work, due for completion in January 2020, should enable staff in the economic crime division to export data for analysis. It should also significantly increase THEMIS's speed and reliability.

### **Judgment**

System upgrades are incomplete.

### **Area for improvement 16**

BLE's approach to identifying vulnerable people is an area for improvement. BLE should develop a corporate definition and ensure that it is applied.

### **Background**

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) revealed that BLE didn't have a single definition of vulnerability.

A suitable definition, supported by training and policies, would provide staff and officers with a common understanding of the range of ways in which people may be vulnerable and help ensure that vulnerable people receive the support they need.

### **Our findings in 2019**

BLE has developed an appropriate definition of vulnerability:

A person is vulnerable if, as a result of their situation or circumstances, they are unable to take care of, or protect themselves or others, from harm, exploitation or other adverse impact on their quality of life.

BLE's managers have communicated the definition to the organisation (with the aim that it is understood and applied). It was circulated via internal memos and has been incorporated into a range of training courses, including probationer training.

The new definition is also central to the force's THRIVE process and has been included in a presentation (on THRIVE) attended by officers.

However, many frontline officers remain unaware of the definition.

## Judgment

While BLE has developed a definition of vulnerability, its approach to identifying vulnerable people remains an area for improvement. It should make sure that officers are aware of the definition and that supervisors check that officers are using it to accurately identify vulnerable people.

## Area for improvement 17

BLE's process for assessing vulnerability in cases not involving domestic violence is an area for improvement. In combination with the development of a definition of vulnerability, BLE should develop processes to ensure officers identify any vulnerabilities of the victims, witnesses, and suspects they encounter, and make appropriate interventions.

## Background

We didn't find evidence that BLE officers must routinely assess the vulnerability of the victims, witnesses and suspects they encounter.

[Our 2018 report](#) said it was likely that some of the vulnerable people BLE officers met weren't identified as such. Therefore they wouldn't receive the appropriate response, whether it be referral for multi-agency intervention or other safeguarding measures.

## Our findings in 2019

BLE has developed a process to make sure officers identify any vulnerable victims, witnesses and suspects they encounter since we published our 2018 report.

BLE has introduced a vulnerability identification safeguarding tool (VIST). Officers must complete a VIST form whenever they encounter a vulnerable person. The PPU then reviews the completed forms and shares them with partner agencies via a [multi-agency safeguarding hub](#) (MASH) or [multi-agency risk assessment conference](#), if appropriate.

PPU told us that officers are completing most VIST forms to a high standard. However, many officers are confused about whether they should complete VIST forms for domestic abuse incidents. Officers must complete a risk identification checklist (RIC) when attending such incidents. This generates a risk score that shows the theoretical level of risk and helps officers decide whether to provide immediate safeguarding action for members of the household.

Many officers feel that VIST forms duplicate the RIC because both are used to identify vulnerability and the need for safeguarding action. Officers don't complete VIST forms when attending domestic abuse incidents.

This is an incorrect interpretation of BLE's policy, which states that officers must complete both VIST and RIC forms at such incidents. This is because the RIC form directs immediate safeguarding actions and the VIST form highlights the need for ongoing safeguarding activity by police and partner agencies.

BLE recognises that it hasn't effectively communicated its VIST policy to response officers. It plans to provide additional guidance about the use of VIST in early 2020.

BLE also recognises that requiring officers to complete VIST and RIC forms at domestic abuse incidents is inefficient, as many questions appear on both forms. Consequently, it plans to amend the RIC form to include the additional information captured by VIST. This will simplify the process. It means that officers won't need to complete VIST forms when attending domestic abuse incidents.

The introduction of VIST highlighted a gap in (the provision of) ongoing safeguarding arrangements for vulnerable adults. While VIST forms identify ongoing safeguarding needs, there are currently limited arrangements in the Bailiwick of Guernsey to provide it. The adult MASH only gets referrals about adults who lack capacity or are in a care setting. Most of the vulnerable adults BLE deals with don't fall in these categories – there isn't any ongoing support for them. BLE has raised this issue with partner agencies and other government departments. A multi-agency review of the adult safeguarding process is planned.

### **Judgment**

This area for improvement has been addressed.

## **Area for improvement 18**

BLE's case allocation practices for public protection cases are an area for improvement. BLE should develop a risk-based allocation policy.

### **Background**

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) found that BLE's PPU didn't carry out all investigations relating to domestic abuse, sexual offences or cases involving child protection. Lower risk cases could be conducted by officers in the CID or the secondary investigation unit.

This was the case in most forces in England and Wales. We said there would always be instances where it made sense for PPU to investigate low risk cases and CID to investigate high-risk cases, and vice versa.

However, unlike forces in England and Wales, BLE lacked a clear risk-based allocation policy. We concluded that those responsible for case allocation and workloads needed such a policy.

### **Our findings in 2019**

BLE has produced a risk-based crime allocation matrix and included it in its THRIVE policy since we reported the findings of our 2017–18 inspection.

The matrix sets out which units should investigate which types of offence. The allocations (in the updated THRIVE policy) are appropriate. More complex and specialist investigations will be conducted by the appropriate specialist units, if BLE adheres to the policy.

Most of the investigations we examined had been allocated to the appropriate units. However, we found examples where the allocation matrix hadn't been followed.

Prior to our inspection, BLE developed plans to review compliance with the allocation matrix as part of a post-implementation review of THRIVE in early 2020.

### **Judgment**

BLE has improved its case allocation practices for public protection cases. However, the new case allocation matrix isn't always used. This remains an area for improvement.

### **Area for improvement 19**

The level of training provided to specialist investigators is an area for improvement. BLE should develop a better understanding of specialist investigators' training needs and ensure it meets them.

### **Background**

We found that BLE didn't give some officers in specialist units enough training.

[Our 2018 report](#) highlighted that PPU officers were concerned that the training they received didn't equip them with the specialist knowledge they needed to deal with vulnerable people or advise their uniformed colleagues.

### **Our findings in 2019**

PPU officers have received additional training since we reported the findings of our 2017–18 inspection:

- all PPU officers have attended Achieving Best Evidence and PIP level 2 training;
- two PPU officers have been on a short secondment to an English force and MASH workshop in Leeds; and
- PPU supervisors have attended a two-week detective sergeants' course in Exeter.

They now all feel confident they have the skills they need to fulfil their roles.

BLE's economic crime division conducted a training needs analysis in 2019. It found that its investigators need a range of additional training to make sure they have the skills to investigate money laundering and other complex financial crime. The States' policy and resources committee has approved a business case for additional resources and training within an extra allocation of £1.3m.

### **Judgment**

BLE has made progress in providing training for specialist investigators. Work to resolve gaps in economic crime division officers' training is ongoing.

## Area for improvement 20

BLE's capacity to discharge its responsibilities in the multi-agency public protection arrangements is an area for improvement. BLE should increase capacity in order to reduce individual officers' workloads and enable more frequent home visits to violent and sexual offenders.

### Background

[Our 2018 report](#) examined BLE's capacity to fulfil its [multi-agency public protection arrangements](#) (MAPPA).

At the time of the inspection, the police officer in BLE's MAPPA unit was managing 76 offenders. Nineteen were in prison. (Fourteen of those prisoners weren't in Guernsey.) This left 57 low-risk offenders.

This was an unacceptably high workload that meant home visits to violent offenders and registered sex offenders – intended to manage the risks they pose – were being delayed.

### Our findings in 2019

BLE has increased the capacity in its MAPPA unit since we reported the findings of our 2017–18 inspection.

It recruited an administrator in January 2019, which seemed to reduce the MAPPA officer's workload. However, the administrator left a few months later. This led to concerns that information and intelligence coming into the office wouldn't be shared in a timely fashion when the MAPPA officer was on leave.

BLE has sought to mitigate this risk by:

- re-advertising the administrative post; and
- ensuring that the officer's email will direct contacts to share any information or intelligence to the generic MAPP email address, which is monitored by the Probation Service.

### Judgment

Work is ongoing to address this area for improvement.

## Area for improvement 21

The process for agreeing BLE's annual budget is an area for improvement. In order to enable effective business planning, the budget should be set sufficiently far in advance, with in-year adjustments to be made where required.

### Background

[Our 2018 report](#) identified problems with the way that BLE's annual budget was agreed. In recent years, BLE hadn't learnt how much money it would have until partway through the financial year.

We were told there had been significant delays in finalising the budget in 2016. This had led to BLE delaying decisions about recruiting staff to fill gaps caused by attrition, because it hadn't been clear if it could afford to recruit. This had resulted in an increased reliance on overtime to cover the gaps.

### **Our findings in 2019**

The process for agreeing BLE's annual budget has improved since we reported the findings of our 2017–18 inspection.

The Committee for Home Affairs informed the head of BLE of BLE's 2020 budget in October 2019. The head of BLE is content that this gave him enough time to facilitate effective business planning.

### **Judgment**

This area for improvement has been addressed.

## **Area for improvement 22**

The legislation concerning police complaints is an area for improvement, specifically the constraint on the Police Complaints Commission when reporting its satisfaction, or otherwise, with investigations. The Committee for Home Affairs should seek a minor amendment to the legislation. When doing so, the Committee should review the recommendations of the 2014 comparative analysis and seek any further amendments it considers necessary. It should also consider extending the Police Complaints Commission's role to include complaints against Guernsey Border Agency.

### **Background**

[Our 2018 inspection report](#) highlighted problems with the legislation governing police complaints.

At the end of each supervised complaint investigation, the Police Complaints Commission prepares a statement on whether the investigation conducted by BLE's professional standards unit was conducted to its satisfaction.

The Police Complaints Commission, force and other stakeholders' interpretation of this legislation was that it may only say it is satisfied or dissatisfied with an investigation. This didn't allow the Commission to provide any explanation of why it was dissatisfied, and therefore risked causing confusion. This had resulted in cases where the Commission agreed with the outcome of a case but had to state that it was dissatisfied because there had been a minor procedural problem.

This could prove confusing to both the complainant and the officer subject to the complaint, and lead to unfair public criticism.

BLE had commissioned an independent review in 2014 that compared Guernsey's system with the legislative framework in England and Wales. It had resulted in a series of recommendations highlighting sections of Guernsey legislation which (the review suggested) should be amended to bring Guernsey in line with England and Wales.



## Our findings in 2019

Activity is ongoing to resolve this area for improvement.

BLE and the Committee for Home Affairs have conducted a review of the Bailiwick's police complaints legislation which identified revising current legislation as a strategic priority.

The Committee awaits the implementation of recommendations made by the [Chapman review on the police disciplinary system in England and Wales](#), which will inform its drafting of the revised Bailiwick of Guernsey police complaints legislation.

It can't extend the revised legislation to include Guernsey Border Agency until certain employment terms and conditions have been resolved.

## Judgment

Work to address this area for improvement is ongoing.

## Area for improvement 23

BLE's ability to provide information to the College of Policing for inclusion in the disapproved register is an area for improvement. The Committee for Home Affairs should seek to enable BLE or the States of Guernsey to provide such information.

## Background

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) found that BLE was keen to share information with the College of Policing for inclusion in the disapproved register,<sup>12</sup> to support policing in England and Wales.

However, there was no mechanism to share this information, which is maintained by the States' human resources function under Guernsey legislation.

## Our findings in 2019

BLE is still unable to access the 'advisory and barred list' (formerly known as the disapproved register) directly – simply because it can't access the Police National Database. (BLE anticipates that it will get accreditation to the network that hosts the database once its ICT infrastructure has been upgraded. See area for improvement 26, below.)

In the two years since our last inspection, there has only been one occasion when it would have been appropriate for BLE to have added a name to the advisory and barred list. In that case, an English police force added the name to the list at the request of BLE.

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<sup>12</sup> The College of Policing's disapproved register contains details of those officers who have been dismissed from the service or who either resigned or retired while subject to a gross misconduct investigation where it had been determined there would have been a case to answer.

Given the infrequency of demand, BLE has decided not to formalise this arrangement with the English force through a service level agreement or memorandum of understanding.

While emphasising the importance of BLE contributing to and referring to the list whenever appropriate (that is, following disciplinary proceedings and during recruitment processes), we agree that this decision is proportionate.

### **Judgment**

This area for improvement has been addressed.

## **Area for improvement 24**

BLE's counter-corruption capability is an area for improvement. BLE should compile a comprehensive local counter-corruption threat assessment and control strategy, to evaluate and manage the full range of risks to the integrity of the organisation.

### **Background**

[Our 2017–18 inspection](#) revealed that BLE lacked a robust counter-corruption capability.

### **Our findings in 2019**

Work is ongoing to address this area for improvement – BLE has started to draft a counter-corruption threat assessment.

BLE's lead for professional standards plans to visit an English police force's anti-corruption unit in early 2020 to draw on their expertise. This should help them develop the threat assessment and a control strategy<sup>13</sup> that says how BLE plans to mitigate the threat of corruption.

Police forces in small jurisdictions face challenges in developing robust counter-corruption capabilities. Counter-corruption is a highly specialised area of work that needs people with specialist knowledge, as well as a range of overt and covert activity that is often beyond the capability of police forces operating in small communities.

In our inspections of other Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories we have suggested that forces consider the potential of developing a collaborative counter-corruption capability. We are aware that BLE is planning to discuss the potential for this solution with forces from other Crown Dependencies, in 2020.

### **Judgment**

Work is ongoing to address this area for improvement.

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<sup>13</sup> A document that sets out and communicates the operational priorities for the force or command area and sets the long-term priorities for crime prevention, intelligence and enforcement. It may also include reassurance opportunities.

## Area for improvement 25

The management of human resources tasks is an area for improvement. The central human resources team, in consultation with BLE, should review each party's human resources responsibilities and provide a clearer definition of where responsibilities should lie.

### Background

[In 2018, we reported that there was confusion about who was responsible for providing certain human resources services for BLE.](#)

We explained that the States had removed human resources functions from Guernsey Police, Guernsey Border Agency and other agencies in 2008. They had been replaced by a central human resources team (within the States).

While this team was regularly involved in matters such as absence management and workforce planning, BLE supervisors and managers said that it was more difficult to access human resources services, and that they had to do more human resources-related administrative work than before the centralisation.

This work included housing licence renewals, writing job descriptions and advertisements, and managing databases.

### Our findings in 2019

The central human resources team has produced a flow chart that outlines who is responsible for a range of common tasks, since we reported the findings of our 2017–18 inspection.

The flow chart more clearly defines where responsibilities should lie. Most BLE staff in management roles that we spoke to are now clearer about their responsibilities and those of the central human resources team.

The central human resources team is also developing a comprehensive guide to human resources responsibilities, which is due to be finalised in early 2020.

### Judgment

This area for improvement has been addressed.

## Area for improvement 26

BLE's ICT provision is an area for improvement. The Committee for Home Affairs and the head of law enforcement should prioritise the development of a new ICT improvement strategy.

## Background

During [our 2017–18 inspection](#) we found a litany of ICT problems affecting BLE. Our report highlighted that:

- computer terminals, network systems and databases were old, fragile and prone to crashing;
- system functionality, network storage capacity, processing power, reliability and stability, integration, security and mobile technology capability were all matters of substantial concern;
- some applications didn't interface where they should, such as NICHE to the Royal Courts and with the police national network in the UK;
- cloud storage facilities weren't working;
- some officers had to wait weeks for log-on facilities, or months to access databases;
- vital computer systems could cease to work without notice and for lengthy periods. These included the Guernsey Border Agency manifest computer and the server for the JESCC; and
- ICT support was less accessible and more remote than it had been when ICT staff worked within the police and borders agency, and telephone calls to the central ICT service centre weren't subject to any service level agreements.

We found that a Committee for Home Affairs ICT recovery plan was in place to address the most serious problems.

We reported that it was plainly evident to us that, even if the present systems could be made more reliable, major capital investment was needed to upgrade them. It would remain a critical issue until the States' ICT received the level of attention and investment it needed.

We concluded that once the recovery plan had been completed, the next stage would be to undertake a comprehensive programme of work to automate and digitise BLE.

For this to succeed, BLE should specify its ICT requirements in detail. (Which couldn't be done until the vision for BLE's future had been set out – see recommendation 1.)

## Our findings in 2019

Considerable progress has been made to increase the stability of Home Affairs and BLE's ICT infrastructure since our 2017–18 inspection.

The Committee for Home Affairs ICT recovery plan has progressed and most of its projects are complete.

All BLE's desktop computers and laptops have been replaced. This, combined with the improvements to the ICT architecture, has reduced the frequency of IT crashes.

In late 2019, the States awarded a contract to an ICT business services company to maintain and enhance its ICT infrastructure. BLE and Home Affairs anticipated that progress would be greatly increased when the contract went live in early 2020.

The new contract includes standard level agreements governing the provision of ICT helpdesk support.

Work is underway to stabilise the ICT infrastructure and BLE is compiling its plans for further ICT development

A wide-ranging justice review took place in 2019. Its findings were to inform a digital road map for the future of ICT development across much of the States, including BLE. However, as the review took longer than anticipated, BLE has started work with ICT professionals in the States and Home Affairs to develop a short-term improvement project.

BLE and the States' ICT professionals recognise that the potential for ICT improvement is limited, as much of the new infrastructure BLE needs can't be installed in police headquarters, due to the fabric of the building.

BLE doesn't yet have a finalised ICT strategy. Once complete, the Justice Review's digital roadmap will inform this, as will BLE's ICT lead's vision for how technology can drive efficiencies. However, it is vital that the strategy reflects the Committee for Home Affairs' strategic direction for BLE (see recommendation 5, above), and that an estates strategy is developed in parallel to make sure BLE has premises that can facilitate the ICT infrastructure improvements.

### **Judgment**

Significant progress has been made to improve BLE's ICT infrastructure, although work remains ongoing.

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